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Escaping the Cycle
Abstract
I present a decision problem in which causal decision theory appears to violate the
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and normal-form extensive-form equiva-
lence (NEE). I show that these violations lead to exploitable behavior and long-run
poverty. These consequences appear damning, but I urge caution. Causalists can
dispute the charge that they violate IIA and NEE in this case by carefully specifying
when two options in different decision problems are similar enough to be counted
as the same.
As I’ll understand it here, the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) saysthat adding an additional option to the menu can’t transform an impermissi-
ble choice into a permissible one. An old story attributed to Sidney Morgenbesser
illustrates the seeming irrationality of violating this principle: asked to decide be-
tween steak and chicken, a man says “I’d rather have the steak”. The waiter tells
him that they also have fish, to which he responds: “Oh, in that case, I’ll have the
chicken”. This behavior looks irrational, and a principle like IIA explains why. It
is quite plausible; all else equal, we should want a theory of rational choice which
vindicates it.
The principle I’ll call normal-form extensive-form equivalence (NEE) says that,
so long as you’re certain to not change your beliefs or desires, and you’re certain
to remain rational, if it’s permissible to choose an option other than X , then, if
you’re given the choice to either have X or go on to choose amongst the other
options, it is permissible to choose to leave X behind.1 If, given a choice between
chicken, steak, and fish, it’s permissible for you to order the steak, then, given a
choice between the fish and a choice between chicken and steak, it’s permissible to
decline the fish. Like IIA, this principle is very plausible; all else equal, we should
want a theory of rational choice which vindicates it.
Here, I’ll present a decision problem—called ‘Utility Cycle’, for reasons
which will become clear—in which orthodox causal decision theory (CDT) ap-
pears to violate both IIA (§2.1) and NEE (§2.2). In minor variants of Utility
Word count: 8,908
1 This is a weakened version of the principle usually called ‘normal-form extensive-form equiv-
alence’; it only infers something about ‘extensive-form’ permissibility from ‘normal-form’ per-
missibility, and it only does so in special conditions. For this reason, it is a bit uncomfortable
to name the principle an ‘equivalence’, but I’ll stick to this terminology nonetheless.
1
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Cycle, these violations lead causalists to engage in exploitable behavior like pay-
ing to have options presented to them in a certain order, and paying to change
their decision once it’s been made, for no apparent reason (§2.3). These conse-
quences look bad. Some will see them as a reason to reject CDT. But I will urge
caution. Principles like IIA and NEE compare two decision problems in which
you are given the same options. So in order to show that CDT violates IIA or
NEE, we must make some assumptions about what it takes for two options, in
two different decision problems, to count as the same. Given a natural assump-
tion about what makes two options the same, CDT will violate IIA and NEE.
But I’ll suggest an alternative approach to causalists which allows them to satisfy
the principles (§§3–4).
The question of when causalists should count two options, in different deci-
sion problems, as being effectively the same or importantly different is interesting
in its own right. But the discussion here bears on other, internecine causalist dis-
putes. There is a class of decision problems in which orthodox CDT’s verdicts
depend upon how likely you think you are to choose each available option. Some
find CDT’s verdicts about these cases objectionable,2 and some have suggested
heterodox causalist theories of rational choice to treat these cases.3 An objection
which has been raised to some of these heterodox theories is that they appear to
run afoul of the IIA.4 One important upshot of my discussion here is that this
criticism is misplaced. Apparent violations of IIA arise in similar ways for ortho-
dox CDT; and the solution I’ll proffer causalists here is available to the heterodox
and orthodox both—moreover, while this solution allows the heterodox causalist
theory I favor to always satisfy IIA and NEE, the same cannot be said for orthodox
CDT (§5).
1 Causal Decision Theory
1.1 Desire. I will assume that, when you face a decision, you have some set of
available options O = {X1,X2, . . . ,XN } between which you must choose. When
making this choice, there is some set of states of nature K = {K1,K2, . . . ,KM },
which, for all you know, may obtain.5 Exactly one of the Ki obtains, though you
know not which; nor are you in any position to influence which obtains. Though
you do not know which Ki obtains, you do have opinions, represented with a
probability function, Pr, defined over both O and K. Finally, we can represent
2 See, e.g., Richter (1984), Egan (2007), Briggs (2010), Wedgwood (2013), Ahmed (2014a),
Spencer & Wells (2017), and Spencer (msa).
3 See, e.g., Wedgwood (2013), Barnett (ms), Spencer (msb), and [author].
4 See, e.g., Bassett (2015) and the discussion in Wedgwood (2013) and Barnett (ms).
5 Throughout, I’ll use letters like ‘X ’ and ‘K ’ to stand both for options and states and the propo-
sition that you’ve chosen those options and that those states obtain. Context will disambiguate.
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D(Row Col ) KL KM
L 100 0
M 110 10
 Pr(Row|Col ) L M
KL 90% 10%
KM 10% 90%

Table 1: Desires and Probabilities for Newcomb. The matrix on the left shows how
strongly you desire choosing the row option while in the column state. The matrix on
the right shows the probability that you are in the row state, given that you’ve chosen the
column option.
your desires with a function,D, which says how strongly you desire that you select
each option, in each state of nature. I assume that, for any option X ∈O,
D(X ) =∑
K
Pr(K | X ) ·D(X K )
D(X ) tells us how good you would expect things to be, were you to learn that
you have chosen X . If D(X ) is high, then you should be glad to learn that you’ve
chosen X —low, and you should be sad to learn that you’ve chosen X .
1.2 Newcomb. Some—known as evidential decision theorists—think thatD(X )
provides a measure of the choiceworthiness of an option X .6 Causal decision the-
orists disagree, because of cases like the following:
Newcomb
You are on a game show. Before you are two boxes, labelled ‘L’ and
‘M ’ (for ‘less’ and ‘more’). You may take one, and only one, of the
boxes. Money was placed in the boxes on the basis of a reliable pre-
diction. If it was predicted that you would take L, then $100 was
placed in box L, and $110 was placed in box M . If it was predicted
that you would take M , then $0 was placed in box L and $10 was
placed in box M . These predictions are 90% reliable—that is, condi-
tional on you selecting box X , the chance that it was predicted that
you would select X is 90%. But nothing you do now will affect how
much money is in the boxes.
We can represent this decision problem with the two matrices shown in table 1.
There are two relevant states of nature. Either it was predicted that you would
take box L, ‘KL’, or it was predicted that you would take box M , ‘KM ’. I suppose
that your desires are linear in dollars, so that the degree to which you desire each
option in each state are as shown in theD-matrix on the left of table 1. The matrix
on the right says: given that you choose box L, you’re 90% likely to be in state KL
and 10% likely to be in state KM . And, given that you choose box M , you’re 10%
likely to be in state KL and 90% likely to be in state KM .
6 For defenses of evidential decision theory, see Jeffrey (1965, 2004) and Ahmed (2014b).
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In Newcomb, you should be happier to learn L than M , since
D(L) = Pr(KL | L) ·D(LKL) + Pr(KM | L) ·D(LKM )
= 90% · 100+ 10% · 0
= 90
while D(M ) = Pr(KL |M ) ·D(MKL) + Pr(KM |M ) ·D(MKM )
= 10% · 110+ 90% · 10
= 20
So evidential decision theorists advise you to take box L. But notice that, no mat-
ter what was predicted, taking box M will get you strictly more money. In each
state of nature, taking box M will get you $10 more than taking L will. Notice
also: if you were to learn which prediction was made, you would be happier to
learn M than L, and evidential decision theorists would advise you to take M—
no matter what you learned. If you were to learn KL, you’d desire M more than
L. And if you were to learn KM , you’d desire M more than L. Evidential deci-
sion theorists therefore violate a principle of deontic reflection: they recommend
options which they know your better informed, future self will wish you had not
chosen.7
We may dramatize this violation of deontic reflection in the case of New-
comb. Suppose that the evidential decision theorist faces Newcomb, and they
are playing, not for themselves, but rather for a poor orphan boy, Oliver. While
they are not allowed to look in the boxes, Oliver is. He is there with them as they
choose. He is allowed to offer the evidentialist advice about which box to choose,
but he is not allowed to tell them the contents of the boxes. He looks inside, and
says: ‘Please, choose box M ’. (Of course he does—the evidentialist knew that’s
what he’d say, no matter what he saw). The evidential decision theorist ignores
Oliver’s advice, and chooses box L instead. They tell him: ‘If you were able to
tell me what the boxes contain, I would agree with you, and I would choose M ,
no matter what you told me. But, since you haven’t told me what’s in the boxes,
I must take box L.’ At this point, the producers of the game show—who are re-
ally pulling for Oliver—intervene. They say: ‘If you allow him, Oliver may tell
you what the boxes contain.’ The evidential decision theorist does not allow him.
They say: ‘If I allow you to tell me what’s in the boxes, then I will end up taking
box M . But currently, I think that’s worse than choosing L. So I think it’s better
for me to not know.’ The producers try a different tack. They say: ‘Alright, if
you don’t listen to what Oliver has to say about the contents of the boxes, then
we’ll take $60 away from whatever Oliver wins (perhaps leaving him with a bill to
pay).’ The evidential decision theorist knows that, if they listen to Oliver, they’ll
7 See Arntzenius (2008)
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take box M . They desire taking M with a strength of $20. On the other hand, if
they don’t listen, they’ll take box L. They desire taking L with a strength of $90.
Minus the $60 lost by not listening, not listening is desired with a strength of $30.
So, in order to keep Oliver quiet, they’ll take $60 away from him.8
Imagine yourself as Oliver, pleading with the evidential decision theorist to
take the box that you can see contains an additional $10. They are choosing only
for your benefit. You are telling them that M is the box which will most benefit
you. They believe you. They know that box M will benefit you the most. Yet
they refuse to take it. They moreover refuse to take the information you are trying
to give them, even though they know that this information is not in any way
misleading, that it will teach them what is objectively in your best interest, and
that their learning this information is objectively in your best interest. To keep
themselves from learning this information, they are willing to take $60 away from
you—though, again, their only concern is maximizing your welfare. Does this
look like the behavior of a rational agent? The causal decision theorist thinks
not, and I agree. And so I think that D does not give an adequate measure of
the choiceworthiness of an option. You should not just choose the option which
you’d be happiest to learn that you’ve chosen. Sometimes, you should be sad to
learn that you’re choosing rationally.
1.3 Utility. According to the orthodox causal decision theorist, we should
measure the choiceworthiness of an option, X , not by looking at how glad you’d
be to learn that you have selected it, D(X ), but rather by looking at the degree to
which you expect X to bring about your desired ends. For each K ∈K,D(X K ) is
the degree to which X would bring about your desired ends, were you to choose
it in the state K . So the quantity
U (X ) def=∑
K
Pr(K ) ·D(X K )
tells us how desirable you expect choosing X to make the world.9
The difference betweenD and U is that, inD, we conditioned the probability
function Pr on the proposition that you choose X . In U , we do not. Your choice
may give evidence that a state of nature obtains, but it does nothing to bring that
state about (that’s what it is for K to be a state of nature). According to causalists,
the fact that an option makes a desired state more likely doesn’t speak in its favor
if it doesn’t causally affect whether that state obtains or not.
Just as you may evaluate the utility of an option, X , from the perspective you
8 See Wells (forthcoming)
9 This is Skyrms’s formulation of causal decision theory. There are alternatives—see, e.g., Lewis
(1981a) and Joyce (1999). The differences between these version of CDT won’t make a difference
to anything I have to say here.
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currently occupy, so too may you evaluate the utility of X from the perspective you
would occupy, were you to choose another option, Y . (I mean: the perspective
you would occupy immediately after choosing Y , before learning anything else.)
From this perspective, you would have learned that you’ve chosen Y , so your
probability for each state K would be Pr(K | Y ), and
UY (X ) def=
∑
K
Pr(K | Y ) ·D(X K )
would be the utility of X . Given the quantities UY (X ), for each pair of options
X and Y , we may calculate U (X ) as follows.10
U (X ) =∑
Y
UY (X ) · Pr(Y )
In a choice between two options, X and Y , both of the following situations
are possible:
Self-Undermining Choice
Once chosen, each option would have a lower utility than the alter-
native
UX (Y ) > UX (X ) and UY (X ) > UY (Y )
Self-Reinforcing Choice
Once chosen, each option would have a higher utility than the alter-
native
UX (X ) > UX (Y ) and UY (Y ) > UY (X )
This can lead CDT’s verdicts to change as you make up your mind about what to
do. In a self-undermining choice, once you follow CDT’s advice and intend to
choose the option it called rational, it will change its mind and call your choice
irrational. In a self-reinforcing choice, if you disregard its advice and do what it
deemed irrational, CDT will change its mind and call you rational for doing so.11
I believe that cases like these give us reason to doubt CDT. I defend a hetero-
dox revision of causal decision theory whose verdicts do not depend upon your
option probabilities. But these kinds of choices won’t be relevant to the arguments
10 In much of what follows, I will spare the reader the tedium of deriving everything explicitly in
the main text. For those who wish to check the math, some advice: multiply the matrixD(Row
Col ) by the matrix Pr(Row|Col ). This gives the matrixUCol (Row), of the utility of the row option,
from the perspective you’d occupy immediately after choosing the column option. The identity
in the body can then be used to easily calculate the unconditional utilities, U (Row).
11 Cf. Gibbard & Harper (1978), Richter (1984), Weirich (1985), Harper (1986), Egan et al.
(2005), Joyce (2012), Hare & Hedden (2016), Armendt (2019), and Williamson (forthcom-
ing).
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against CDT which I’ll introduce below.12 For those arguments, I need only ap-
peal to the following, minimal commitment of CDT, which is also endorsed by
heterodox causalists like myself:13
CDT In a choice between two options, X and Y , if X ’s utility would exceed Y ’s,
whichever you chose,
UX (X ) > UX (Y ) and UY (X ) > UY (Y )
then X is required and Y is impermissible.
(Thus: I distinguish between CDT and the boldface CDT. The latter is strictly
weaker than the former; CDT only applies in choices between two options, where
the choice is neither self-undermining nor self-reinforcing.) In Newcomb, CDT
tells us that M is required and L is impermissible. You know that, no matter what
was predicted, M will get you $10 more than L does. So, if you choose L, then
the utility of M will exceed the utility of L by 10 (UL(M ) = 100 and UL(L) = 90).
And, if you choose M , then the utility of M will exceed the utility of L by 10
(UM (M ) = 20 and UM (L) = 10). So the utility of M will exceed the utility of L,
whichever box you happen to take.
2 Utility Cycle, and Three Objections to CDT
Consider the following decision problem:14
Utility Cycle
Before you are three boxes, labeled ‘A’, ‘B ’, and ‘C ’. You may take
one and only one of the boxes. The contents of the boxes were de-
cided on the basis of a prediction about how you would choose. If it
was predicted that you would choose A, $100 was left in B and a bill
for $100 was left in C . If it was predicted that you would choose B ,
$100 was left in C and a bill for $100 was left in A. If it was predicted
you would choose C , $100 was left in A and a bill for $100 was left
in B . These predictions are 80% reliable.
Your desires and probabilities for this problem are shown in table 2. Which option
has the highest utility depends upon how likely you think you are to select each
option. Let ‘a’, ‘b ’, and ‘c ’ be your probabilities that you will take box A, B , and
C , respectively. Then:
U (A) = 70(c − b ) U (B ) = 70(a − c ) U (C ) = 70(b − a)
12 Though I’ll return to these kinds of choices in §6.
13 CDT is accepted by Wedgwood (2013), Barnett (ms), Spencer (msb), and [author].
14 Cf. Ahmed (2012) and Hare & Hedden (2016).
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
D(Row Col ) KA KB KC
A 0 −100 100
B 100 0 −100
C −100 100 0
 
Pr( Row |Col ) A B C
KA 80% 10% 10%
KB 10% 80% 10%
KC 10% 10% 80%

Table 2: Desires and Probabilities for Utility Cycle
So, for illustration: if you’re most likely to take A, and more likely to take B than
C (a > b > c ), then B will have the highest utility; if you’re most likely to take
B , and more likely to take C than A (b > c > a), then C will have the highest
utility; and if you’re more likely to take C than A, and more likely to take A than
B (c > a > b ), then A will have the highest utility.
Suppose now that you are given a choice between just A and B—C is taken
off of the menu (note, however, that even though you are guaranteed to not take
C , there is still a 10% probability that it was falsely predicted that you’d take C ).
In that case, your probability for C , c , is constrained to be zero, and the utilities
for A and B are:
U (A) = 70a − 70 U (B ) = 70a
No matter the value of a, B will have a higher utility than A. So CDT says that,
in a choice between A and B , B is required and A is impermissible. Suppose, on
the other hand, that A is removed from the menu, and you are given a choice
between B and C . In that case, your probability for A, a, is constrained to be
zero, and the utilities of B and C are:
U (B ) = 70b − 70 U (C ) = 70b
Again, no matter the value of b , the utility of C will exceed the utility of B . So
CDT says that, in a choice between B and C , C is required and B is impermissi-
ble. Similarly, if B is removed from the menu, and you are given a choice between
C and A, the utilities of C and A will be:
U (C ) = 70c − 70 U (A) = 70c
The utility of A will exceed the utility of C , no matter the value of c . So CDT
says that, in a choice between C and A, A is required and C is impermissible.
2.1 The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If we assume that Utility
Cycle is not a rational dilemma (i.e., if we assume that some option is permissible),
then CDT appears to lead to a violation of a principle known as the independence
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of irrelevant alternatives (or just ‘IIA’).
IIA: If, given a choice between X and Y , Y is not permissible, then, given a
choice between X ,Y , and Z , Y is not permissible.
According to CDT, every option in Utility Cycle is impermissible in a one-on-
one choice with some alternative. So, if some option is permissible,15 we will have a
violation of IIA. For illustration: suppose that A is a permissible choice in Utility
Cycle. By CDT, given a choice between A and B , A is impermissible. So A is not
a permissible choice when you are presented with the restricted menu {A,B}, but
it is a permissible choice when you are presented with the larger menu {A,B ,C }.
And this contradicts IIA. The same goes if we say that B or C is permissible
instead. For CDT says that B is impermissible on the restricted menu {B ,C },
and C is impermissible on the restricted menu {C ,A}.
2.2 Normal-Form Extensive-Form Equivalence. Utility Cycle also shows
that CDT violates a weak principle of normal-form extensive-form equivalence (or
just ‘NEE’).
NEE: If you are certain to remain rational and your beliefs and desires are certain
to not change, then, if it is permissible to not choose X when given a choice
between X ,Y , and Z , then, given a choice between X and going on to
choose between Y and Z , it is permissible to not choose X .
The antecedent of NEE is important. Suppose you think that your beliefs or
desires might change after choosing ∼X and before choosing between Y and Z .
Then, it may be rational to choose X now in order to take the decision out of the
hands of your not-entirely-trustworthy future self. Likewise, if you fear that your
future self will not choose rationally, this could give additional reason to select
X at stage one. However, restricted to cases where you are certain to retain your
beliefs, desires, and rationality, NEE is very plausible.
Consider now the following two choices:
A or ∼A
Money was distributed between boxes A, B , and C as in Util-
ity Cycle. At stage 1, you are given a choice to either take box
A or to not. If you take box A, then you receive its contents. If
you don’t take A, then at stage 2, you choose between B and C .
(See figure 1a.) You are certain to retain your beliefs, desires, and
rationality throughout.
15 By the symmetry of the case, we should conclude that every option is permissible, but we need
not assume this in order to make the present point.
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(a) A or ∼A (b) B or ∼B
Figure 1
B or ∼B
Money was distributed between boxes A, B , and C as in Utility
Cycle. At stage 1, you are given a choice to either take box B or to
not. If you take box B , then you receive its contents. If you don’t
take B , then at stage 2, you choose between A and C . (See figure
1b.) You are certain to retain your beliefs, desires, and rationality
throughout.
Assume you know that you abide CDT, and that you will continue to do so
throughout any sequential decisions. Then, in A or ∼A, if you choose ∼A at
stage 1, at stage 2, you will choose C , and you know this at stage 1. So, at stage 1,
you face a choice between A and C . So A is required at stage 1. In B or ∼B, if
you choose ∼B at stage 1, then, at stage 2, you will choose A, and you know this
at stage 1. So, at stage 1, you face a choice between B and A. So B is required at
stage 1.
We can now show that, assuming some option is permissible, CDT violates
NEE in Utility Cycle. For, given the choice between A, B , and C , B is either
permissible or it is not. Suppose it is. Then, NEE says that ∼A is permissible in
A or ∼A. CDT on the other hand, says that ∼A is impermissible, contradicting
NEE. Suppose on the other hand that B is impermissible. Then, it is permissible
to not choose B . In that case, NEE says that ∼B is permissible in B or ∼B. CDT,
on the other hand, says that ∼B is impermissible, contradicting NEE. Either way,
CDT contradicts NEE.
2.3 Predictable Long-run Poverty. CDT’s advice in Utility Cycle may be
exploited to lose you money in the long run. Suppose that, instead of taking a
box yourself, you select a box with the aid of an assistant. You tell the assistant
which box to take, but it is the assistant who makes the final choice. (You keep
the money. Note also that the reliable predictions are now about which box your
assistant will end up selecting.) By the symmetry of the case, you see no reason
to favor any box over the others, and you tell your assistant to take box A. Before
your assistant departs, they get an idea. They say: ‘Are you sure? I’ll give you an
opportunity to change to box B (but not box C—I’m taking that off the menu).
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In exchange for changing your mind, I’ll require sixty dollars.’ (You are certain
that they will take this decision to be final, they will take the box you decide upon,
and that there’s no longer any way to get them to take C .) At this point, you face
a new decision: not between A, B , and C , but instead between staying with A
and changing to B and losing sixty dollars. If a is your probability for taking A,
then the utilities of the available options are:
U (A) = 70a − 70 U (B ) = 70a − 60
In this new decision, switching to B will have a higher utility than staying with A,
no matter whether you take A or switch to B . So CDT says to hand your assistant
sixty dollars to have them take B instead. But you could have had B in the first
place, for free. How could your assistant’s offer give you reason to switch?
Nothing changes if we suppose that you know in advance that your assistant
will make you an offer of this kind. No matter which box you initially select, the
assistant will be able to offer you a trade for another box, at a cost of $60, which
you will see as favorable, as long as you abide by CDT. There’s no initial selection
which will prevent your future self from making the trade.
Note that, if you make the trade, then you will likely end up losing money
overall. You have an 80% chance of breaking even, a 10% chance of winning $100,
and a 10% chance of losing $100—so you have an expected return of $0. And
you’ve just handed over $60. In the long run in which you make this decision
over and over again, with your assistant offering the trade each time, you will
lose $60 on average. You could have instead broke even on average, if only you’d
refused the assistant’s trade.
Causalists are used to making less money in certain decision problems. For in-
stance, anyone who takes box M in Newcomb will predictably make less money,
over the long run, than someone who takes box L. The usual causalist reply is con-
vincing: this is true, but only because those who take L will typically be provided
with more money than those who take box M . Being afforded greater opportuni-
ties for wealth is no sign of rationality; nor is being afforded fewer opportuntities
for wealth a sign of irrationality. So predictable poverty in Newcomb is no sign
of irrationality.16 A comparable defense is not available here. In this case, it was
not an unfortunate environment which led to your poverty. Over the long run,
someone who was indifferent between A and B when given a choice between the
two would never pay to switch, and they would predictably end up making more
money in the long run.
CDT will advise you to pay to have the options presented to you in a certain
order—even when you’re certain to retain your beliefs, desires, and rationality
16 See, e.g., Gibbard & Harper (1978), Lewis (1981b), Joyce (1999), Bales (2018), and Wells
(forthcoming).
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Figure 2: Pay or A
throughout. For instance, consider Pay or A:
Pay or A
Money is distriuted between boxes A, B , andC as in Utility Cycle.
At stage 1, you may either pay $60, P , or not, ∼P . If you pay, then,
at stage 2, you will face the decision B or ∼B. If you do not, then,
at stage 2, you will face A or ∼A. (See figure 2.)
If you know that you abide CDT, you will choose A in A or ∼A. So, if you don’t
pay, you will end up choosing A. If you abide CDT, you will choose B in B or
∼B. So, if you pay, you will end up choosing B . So, at stage 1, you face a choice
between paying $60 and taking box B and not paying and taking box A. This is
the same choice you faced with your assistant. And, again, CDT tells you to pay
the $60.
Again, paying likely leads to you losing money overall. Whether you play A
or ∼A or B or ∼B, the expected return is $0. So in the long run in which you
decide to pay in Pay or A over and over again, you will lose $60 on average. Again,
someone who was indifferent between A, B , and C when given a choice between
any two would predictably make more money when facing exactly the same choice
in exactly the same circumstances. The series of choices advised by CDT—pay,
then take B—are causally dominated. No matter what was predicted, another
series of choices—don’t pay, then refuse A, then take B—makes $60 more. So this
predictable poverty does not appear to be a consequence of poor opportunities.
3 Options
These consequences of CDT look bad. These do not appear to be the choices of
a rational agent. It’s natural to see the foregoing as an argument against CDT.
However, I want to urge caution. Though I reject orthodox causal decision theory,
I believe that the weaker claim CDT is correct, and I accept what it says about
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Utility Cycle.17 Defenders of CDT could reject the principles IIA and NEE;18
or they could insist that Utility Cycle is a rational dilemma in which no option
is permissible.19 These moves are available, but I think there’s a more attractive
option. In my view, the lesson causalists ought to draw from the case is this:
taking box A is an importantly different (and worse) option when it appears on
the menu {A,B} than it is when it appears on the menu {A,B ,C }.
3.1 Individuating Options. When thinking about principles like IIA and
NEE, it is important to be clear about when two options, in two different deci-
sion problems, are similar enough to be counted as effectively the same option.20
Some apparent counterexamples to the principle are not genuine counterexam-
ples, because they conflate importantly different options. You arrive at the boss’s
house for dinner. If she offers you soda or beer, you’re disposed to opt for soda
(you don’t want to come off like a drunkard). If she offers you soda, beer, or
whiskey, you’re disposed to opt for beer (you don’t want to come off as either too
straight-laced or too intemperate).21 Do these choice dispositions violate IIA? No.
What you value in your drink choice is the signal it sends to your boss, and what
signal it sends can depend upon the alternatives she offers you. Additionally, if
she offers you whiskey, this provides you with important information about how
that signal will be received. This should change the way that you evaluate the beer
and soda, and it makes them relevantly different options.
When I argued that CDT violated IIA above, I was implicitly assuming that
taking box A was the same option when it appeared on the menu {A,B} as it was
when it appeared on the menu {A,B ,C }. In general terms, I was assuming that
X and X ∗, in two different decision problems, are the same iff you desire them to
the same degree, in every possible state of nature, and your subjective probability
distribution over states, conditional on X , is the same as your subjective proba-
bility distribution over states, conditional on X ∗. Call this ‘the simple view’ of
option individuation.
The Simple View Options X and X ∗, in two different decision problems, are the
17 That is to say: I accept what CDT says about the choice between any two options in Utility
Cycle. In a choice between A,B , and C , I say you should be indifferent between all three, and
that this does not depend upon your option probabilities. See [author] for details.
18 Cf. Wedgwood (2013), who rejects IIA.
19 Cf. Harper (1986).
20 To say that options are the same is not to say that they are numerically identical. If X and X ∗
are options in different decision problems, then they ipso facto differ; by Leibniz’s Law, they
are distinct. Nonetheless, they may be the same—they may be similar in all respects which are
relevant to choice. It is the latter notion of sameness which is my focus here; when I talk about
‘option individuation’, I am talking about when to say two options are the same, and not when
to say that they are identical.
21 Cf. Sen (1993).
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same iff, for each state of nature K :
(a) D(X K ) =D(X ∗K ); and
(b) Pr(K | X ) = Pr(K | X ∗).22
This is a natural and plausible way of saying when two options are the same.
According to it, choosing beer over soda is relevantly different from choosing beer
over soda and whiskey—for, when you are offered whiskey as an alternative, this
changes your opinions about which signal beer will send, which changes either
the degree to which you desire choosing beer in some state of nature, or your
opinions about how likely some state is, or both.23
Some causalists may wish to say that your option probabilities also play an
important role in determining when options are the same. They may wish to say
that X and X ∗ are the same iff: a) D(X K ) = D(X ∗K ), for each state of nature
K ; b) Pr(K | X ) = Pr(K | X ∗), for each K ; and c) Pr(X ) = Pr(X ∗). This would
reconcile CDT with IIA and NEE, but at the price of trivializing the latter. Given
a menu of options {X ,Y }, you will necessarily have Pr(X ) + Pr(Y ) = 1. Then,
given the larger menu {X ,Y ,Z }, the only way for X and Y to remain the same
options would be for Pr(Z ) to be zero. So long as you leave open that you’ll select
each available option, you’ll never be presented with the same options on a larger
menu, and principles like IIA and NEE will impose no constraint at all.
Alternatively, we may wish to say that your (unconditional) state probabil-
ities help to determine when options are the same. That is, we may suggest:
X and X ∗, in two different decision problems, are the same iff, for each K : a)
D(X K ) = D(X ∗K ); b) Pr(K | X ) = Pr(K | X ∗); and c) K has the same uncon-
ditional probability, Pr(K ), in both decision problems. This suggestion does not
trivialize IIA and NEE, though it has other undesirable consequences. For note
that the law of total probability tells us that each K ’s unconditional probability
is a weighted average of its probability conditional on each option, with weights
given by your option probabilities, Pr(K ) =∑X Pr(K | X )·Pr(X ). And note that,
while your conditional probabilities Pr(K | X ) are fixed, as you deliberate about
what to do, your option probabilities, Pr(X ), will change. Let us narrow our at-
tention to the kinds of cases in which EDT and CDT disagree—cases in which
Pr(K | X ) ̸= Pr(K | Y ), for some X ̸= Y . Call these the ‘interesting’ cases. In the
interesting cases, changes in your option probabilities will lead to changes in your
22 To be clear: when I write equations like ‘D(X K ) =D(X ∗K )’ and ‘Pr(K | X ) = Pr(K | X ∗)’, the
desire and probability functions on the left should be understood to be the desire and probability
functions from the first decision problem, and those on the right should be understood to be
the desire and probability functions from the second decision problem.
23 Which we say is changed will depend upon what we say the states of nature are when we specify
the decision problem. Since, in this decision problem, states of nature are probabilistically inde-
pendent of acts, changes in your opinions about how likely some state is will violate condition
(b) of the simple view.
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(unconditional) state probabilities. So, on this suggestion, the very act of deliber-
ating about what to choose changes the options between which you are choosing.
This is odd. We normally think that the options about which you should be delib-
erating are the possible objects of choice for you. And, according to this proposal
for individuating options, this won’t be so in interesting cases. If you were to re-
solve to choose X , you would give yourself the evidence that you will choose X ; so
your option probability Pr(X ) would go up, and your unconditional probability
distribution over states would change. So the option you would end up choosing
would be relevantly different from the one about which you were initially deliber-
ating. Also, note that, if we individuate decision problems partly in terms of the
options available to you, then this method of individuating options would mean
that, in interesting cases, it is impossible to make up your mind about what to
do in an interesting decision problem. Making up your mind would change the
decision problem you face. (The same considerations apply to the suggestion to
individuate options in terms of your option probabilities.)
So I don’t think that we should appeal to your option probabilities or your
state probabilities as a way of distinguishing the option of choosing box A from
the menu {A,B} and the option of choosing box A from the menu {A,B ,C }.
Nonetheless, I think that we should distinguish these two options. In the follow-
ing, I’ll offer the causalist a different account of when two options are the same
(§3.2). I will then explain how this account allows causalists to dispute the charge
that they violate IIA and NEE in Utility Cycle (§4).
3.2 Utility Profiles. If the probabilities assigned to states were constant through-
out deliberation—if they did not vary with your option probabilities—then causal-
ists could say: options X and X ∗ are the same iff D(X K ) = D(X ∗K ), for each
state K , and you have the same probability distribution over states. From these
quantities, we can calculate the utilities of the options X and X ∗; so, if these
quantities are the same, X and X ∗ will have the same utilities, and neither these
utilities nor the utilities of the other options would change over the course of
deliberation.
In many decision problems, the probabilities assigned to states are constant
throughout deliberation, so that, as you make up your mind about what to do,
your utilities do not change. Nonetheless, this does not hold in general—and it
does not hold in the kinds of cases in which EDT and CDT disagree. We should
want to individuate options in such a way that the available options remain the
same throughout deliberation, so we should want to individuate them in terms
of a property which does not change during deliberation. One property like this
is the conditional probability of each state, K , given each option X , Pr(K | X ).
This is one reason why the simple view is so natural.
But there are other important properties of a decision problem which do not
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change over the course of deliberation. In particular: the utility you would assign
to an option, were you to choose any of the options—that is, the values UY (X ),
for each Y —do not change as you deliberate. And my (tentative) suggestion to
causalists is that they individuate an option, X , partly in terms of these quantities
(though see the discussion in §5 below). If this is done carelessly, it can end up
trivializing principles like IIA and NEE. Given a choice between X and Y , there
are two different potential post-choice perspectives from which to evaluate the
utility of X : UX (X ) and UY (X ). Given a choice between X , Y , and Z , there
are three: UX (X ), UY (X ), and UZ (X ). If this is enough to make X count as a
different option, then it will be impossible for the same option to appear on two
different menus, and IIA will impose no constraint at all.
Let us proceed more carefully. Suppose you face a decision problem with the
menu of optionsM, and an option X ∈M. Let us define X ’s utility profile, on the
menuM—which I’ll write ‘UM(X )’—to be the set of utilities which are assigned
to X , from the perspective you’d occupy after having selected any of the options
Y ∈M.
UM(X ) def= {UY (X ) | Y ∈M}
Notice that X ’s utility profile does not vary with your option probabilities. So, if
we individuate options in terms of their utility profiles, the available options will
not change during deliberation. Nor does individuating options in terms of their
utility profiles trivialize principles like IIA. Take a mundane example: the utility
of steak does not depend upon whether you order steak, chicken, or fish. So we
may say that steak is the same option whether it’s on a menu with chicken or on
a menu with chicken and fish. Then, IIA will say that, if it is not permissible to
choose steak from the first menu, it’s not permissible to choose it from the second
menu, either.
Additionally, in the interesting cases where CDT and EDT part ways, options
on two different menus can share a utility profile. Suppose that, in Newcomb,
we include an additional box, labeled ‘L∗’, which is guaranteed to contain the
same amount of money as L. If it was predicted that you’d take L, then there is
$100 in both L and L∗ and $110 in M . If it was predicted that you’d take either
L∗ or M , then there’s $10 in M and nothing in either L or L∗. As in the original
Newcomb, these predictions are 90% reliable.24 This additional option will not
affect the utility profiles of either L or M , so we will say that L and M are the same
options after L∗ is added, and IIA will entail that, if L is impermissible to select
in the original Newcomb, it is also impermissible to select when L∗ is included
on the menu of options.25
24 That is: conditional on your choosing either M or L∗, you’re 90% sure that there’s $0 in L and
L∗ and $10 in M ; and, conditional on your choosing L, you’re 90% sure that there’s $100 in L
and L∗ and $110 in M .
25 Objection: Suppose that, conditional on choosing L∗, you are 100% sure that there’s $0 in L and
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More carefully, the suggestion is:
Same Option Given two different decision problems, with the menus of options
M and M∗, X ∈M and X ∗ ∈M∗ are the same iff, for each state of nature
K :
(a) D(X K ) =D(X ∗K );
(b) Pr(K | X ) = Pr(K | X ∗); and
(c) UM(X ) = UM∗(X ∗).
4 Escaping the Cycle
If Same Option is accepted, then A on the restricted menu M = {A,B} will be
a different (and worse) option than A on the expanded menu M∗ = {A,B ,C }.
On the restricted menu, A’s utility profile contains no positive values, UM(A) =
{−70,0}. Whereas, on the expanded menu, A’s utility profile contains positive
values, UM∗(A) = {−70,0,70}. So UM(A) ̸= UM∗(A), and the options are not the
same, according to Same Option. This means that, if options are individuated
as Same Option dictates, then CDT does not violate IIA in Utility Cycle.
Though A is impermissible in a choice between A and B , that very option is not
impermissible in a choice between A, B , and C . Including the additional option
C changes A’s utility profile, making it a different option.
For similar reasons, individuating options with Same Option means that
CDT does not violate NEE. For, on the menu {A,∼A}, A’s utility profile is
{0,70}. (Since you are sure that choosing ∼A will lead your future self to choose
C , your probability distribution over states, conditional on ∼A, is the same as
your probability distribution over states, conditional on C , so U∼A(A) is equal to
UC (A).) But, again, on the full menu {A,B ,C }, A’s utility profile is {−70,0,70}.
So, when you are asked to take box A or leave it, you are being offered a differ-
ent (and better) option than you are offered when you’re given a choice between
A,B , or C , and we do not have a violation of NEE. Likewise, if we accept Same
Option, then we will object to my earlier claim that those who abide CDT will
pay to have options presented to them in a certain order. On the contrary: they
will pay to be presented with different (and better) options.
No amount of quibbling about how to individuate options will change the
fact that those who abide CDT will lose $60, on average, in the sequential deci-
sions from §2.3, while those who are always indifferent between A,B , andC given
L∗ and $10 in M . Then including L∗ will change the utility profiles of L and M . But L∗ should
still be treated as an irrelevant alternative, and you should still choose M once it is added. Reply:
I agree that you should still choose M in this decision problem, and that, in some good sense
of ‘irrelevant’, L∗ is an irrelevant option (you certainly shouldn’t choose it), but I don’t take it to
be an objection to Same Option that it, together with IIA, does not tell us so. We can’t expect
weak principles like IIA to tell us everything ; it is enough that they tell us something non-trivial.
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a choice between any two, will break even, on average. But I think that causalists
should accept and defend this consequence of their view. In the first place, they
can offer a tu quoque: in other sequential decisions, evidential decision theorists
will end up predictably poorer than causalists.26 More convincingly, they can ob-
ject to using outcomes in sequential decisions to evaluate the rationality of agents
who are incapable of binding their future selves to a certain course of action. The
various temporal parts of these agents are like separate agents, each facing their
own, separate decisions, incapable of coordinating their actions. The fact that
such agents can be led to predictable ruin through a series of rational choices is
just an intrapersonal tragedy of the commons.27 (We may think that intrapersonal
tragedies of the commons are not possible, because we think that the rationality
of later choices is importantly constrained in some way by which choices were
made earlier, and for which reasons.28 Whether that’s so is an interesting debate,
but it cross-cuts the debate between evidentialists and causalists. Causalists and
evidentialists both have the option to affirm or deny that, at the beginning of a
sequential decision problem, you should form the plan or the intention which is
most choiceworthy, and that, ceteris paribus, rationality demands that you stick
to that plan or follow through on that intention. If either affirms, they won’t face
these kinds of objections; if either denies, they will.)
5 Further Discussion
So Same Option allows causalists to reconcile CDT with IIA and NEE and
thereby escape the cycle. However, I expect some readers to find it a bit ad hoc.
They may say: ‘yes, the quantities UY (X ) do not change during the course of
deliberation—but why are these quantities relevant to rational choice?’ I believe
that there are things to be said here. For instance, the utility of an option is
just a weighted average of the the quantities UY (X ), with weights given by your
option probabilities, U (X ) = ∑Y UY (X ) · Pr(Y ). So, while U (X ) corresponds
to choiceworthiness, it is determined by the quantities UY (X ) and your option
probabilities. So X ’s utility profile represents the component of utility which is
invariant throughout deliberation. Nonetheless, those readers who worry about
Same Option being ad hoc have my sympathy. As I mentioned in §1.3 above,
I do not accept CDT in full generality. In particular, I reject it in cases with
the structures of Self-Undermining Choice and Self-Reinforcing Choice.
And the theory of rational choice which I endorse in those cases allows us to give
a different—and, from my perspective at least, less ad hoc—motivation for indi-
26 See Wells (forthcoming).
27 See Arntzenius et al. (2004) for further defense of this view, and see Meacham (2010) for a
reply. See also Ahmed (2014b, §7.4.3) and Spencer (msa, §5).
28 See, e.g., McClennan (1990) and Bratman (1999).
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D(Row Col ) KA KD
A 100 0
D 0 100
 Pr( Row | Col ) A D
KA 70% 25%
KD 30% 75%

Table 3: Desires and Probabilities for Cake in Damascus. (‘A’ says that you go to Aleppo,
‘D ’ says that you go to Damascus, ‘KA’ says that it was predicted that you’d got to Aleppo,
and ‘KD ’ says that it was predicted that you would go to Damascus.)
viduating options with Same Option.
Recall, in Self-Reinforcing Choice, choosing either option would give
you the good news that your choice will make things better than the alterna-
tive would—UX (X ) > UX (Y ) and UY (Y ) > UY (X ). For a concrete case like this,
consider:29
Cake in Damascus
You must choose whether to go to Damascus or Aleppo. Yesterday,
your fairy godmother made a prediction about which you would
choose, and she left you cake in the predicted city. Her predictions
are quite reliable, but she has a tendency to guess Damascus. Con-
ditional on you going to Damascus, you’re 75% sure that cake awaits
in Damascus; whereas, conditional on you going to Aleppo, you’re
only 70% sure that cake awaits there. Getting cake is the only thing
you care about.
Your desires and probabilities for Cake in Damascus are shown in table 3. As the
reader may verify for themselves, in this choice, UA(A) = 70 > 30 = UA(D), and
UD (D) = 75 > 25 = UD (A). So this case has the structure of Self-Reinforcing
Choice. Going to Damascus gives you the good news that cake likely awaits in
Damascus. And going to Aleppo gives you the good news that cake likely awaits
in Aleppo.
In Cake in Damascus choosing either option would give you good news
about what you are doing to make the world better. However, one of the options
(going to Damascus) gives you better news about what you are doing to make
things better. Orthodox CDT says that which option you should choose depends
upon your option probabilities. I disagree. I say you should choose the option
which would give you the best news about what you’re doing to bring about your
desired ends. The difference UX (X )− UX (Y ) says how good the news X would
give you is. And the difference UY (Y )−UY (X ) says how good the news Y would
give you is. So, if the former is greater than the latter—if [UX (X ) − UX (Y )] >
[UY (Y ) − UY (X )]—then X ’s news is better than Y ’s, and I say that you should
29 Similar cases are discussed in Hunter & Richter (1978) and Hare & Hedden (2016). (‘Cake
in Damascus’ is a reference to Gibbard & Harper (1978)’s ‘Death in Damascus’.)
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prefer X . If [UX (X )−UX (Y )] < [UY (Y )−UY (X )], then Y ’s news is better than
X ’s, and I say that you should prefer Y . If they are equal, then X ’s and Y ’s news
is equally good—in that case, I say that you should be indifferent between them.
(Now, don’t get it twisted: when I say that choosing an option gives you ‘good
news’, I don’t mean that it tells you that the world as a whole is good. I agree with
orthodox CDT that that kind of news is irrelevant to rational choice. I mean
instead that it tells you you that your choice is making the world better than the
alternative would. And I think that this kind of news is highly relevant to rational
choice.)
Let’s define the degree to which X ’s news is better than Y ’s, N (X ,Y ) def=
[UX (X ) − UX (Y )] − [UY (Y ) − UY (X )]. Then, more perspicaciously, I say that
N (X ,Y ) measures the strength of your reasons to prefer X to Y . If N (X ,Y ) is
positive, then you have reason to prefer X to Y ; negative, and you have reason
to prefer Y to X ; zero, and you have reason to be indifferent between X and Y .
The same theory handles cases with the structure of Self-Frustrating Choice,
as the reader may verify for themselves.30
More must be said to generalize this theory to choices between more than two
options. I won’t go into it here, but see [author] for the details. The important
point for present purposes is just that, according to this theory, if you want to
check whether you have reason to prefer X to Y , you should look at the quantity
N (X ,Y ), which is defined in terms of the quantities UX (X ),UY (X ),UX (Y ), and
UY (Y )—that is, you should look at the values which appear in X and Y ’s utility
profiles. On this theory, then, it is not ad hoc to want to include these quantities
in our characterization of when options are the same—for these are precisely the
quantities we use to evaluate acts for choiceworthiness. So: while both orthodox
CDT and my preferred causalist theory of rational choice are able to escape the
cycle, it appears to me that my escape route is slightly less ad hoc than the orthodox
causalist’s.
As a brief aside: at the end of the day, I personally prefer a slightly different
approach to individuating options. On my preferred approach, we may begin by
defining X ’s news profile, on the menuM—which I’ll write ‘NM(X )’—to be the
set of all the quantities N (X ,Y ), for the various options Y ∈M.
NM(X ) def= {N (X ,Y ) | Y ∈M}
Since the quantities N (X ,Y ) do not change over the course of deliberation, X ’s
news profile will not change over the course of deliberation. Then, we may say
30 This theory is also endorsed in Barnett (ms). Barnett and I agree about how to choose in
two-option cases, though we disagree about cases like Utility Cycle. Barnett says that your
preferences in Utility Cycle should by cyclic—you should prefer A to B , B to C , and C to A.
I disagree; I think that you should be indifferent between A, B , and C . But this disagreement
isn’t relevant for present purposes. See [author] for more.
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that two options, in two different decision problems, are the same only if they
have the same news profiles.
Same Option∗ Given two different decision problems, with the menus of op-
tions M and M∗, X ∈ M and X ∗ ∈ M∗ are the same iff, for each state of
nature K :
(a) D(X K ) =D(X ∗K );
(b) Pr(K | X ) = Pr(K | X ∗); and
(c) NM(X ) =NM∗(X ∗).
This is the method of option individuation which I myself endorse. The dif-
ferences between it and Same Option will not be relevant when we consider
cases like Utility Cycle. In that decision problem, Same Option∗—just like
SameOption—allows us to distinguish the option A on the restricted menuM =
{A,B} from the option A on the expanded menu M∗ = {A,B ,C }. On the re-
stricted menu, NM(A) = {−140,0}; whereas, on the expanded menu, NM∗(A) =
{−140,0,140}. So we may still insist that selecting A from the restricted menu
is a different (and worse) option than selecting A from the expanded menu.
It’s also worth noting that, while my theory of rational choice, together with
SameOption∗, will always satisfy IIA andNEE—see [author] for details—orthodox
CDT has a harder time satisfying IIA and NEE in general. Suppose that you
always begin deliberation thinking that you are equally likely to select each of
the available options. Then, in cases with the structure of Self-Reinforcing
Choice, orthodox CDT will violate both IIA and NEE, even when options are
individuated with Same Option (or Same Option∗).
For illustration, return to Cake in Damascus. Suppose that you always be-
gin deliberation by distributing your option probabilities evenly. Then, at the
beginning of deliberation, you will assign A and D the utilities U (A) = 42.5 and
U (D) = 52.5. So orthodox CDT will say that A is impermissible and that D is
required. It will not change this verdict as you resolve to go to Damascus and
raise your option probability for D to 100%. But now suppose we introduce an
additional option: a new road to Aleppo has opened up. This road doesn’t differ
from the original road in any respect that you care about. You now face a choice
between A (going to Aleppo via the original road), A∗ (going to Aleppo via the
new road), and D (going to Damascus). If you again begin deliberation by dis-
tributing your option probabilities evenly, then you will assign A,A∗, and D the
utilities: U (A) = U (A∗) = 55 and U (D) = 45. So CDT will say that A is permis-
sible. It will continue to say this as you resolve to choose A (or A∗) and raise your
option probability for A (or A∗) to 100%.
So, in your choice between A and D , CDT says that A is impermissible. But,
in your choice between A,D , and A∗, it says that A is permissible. Since both A
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and D have the same utility profiles (and news profiles) in both of these choices,
CDT violates IIA, given that options are individuated with Same Option (or
with Same Option∗).
Using the same decision, we can construct a counterexample to NEE. Again,
suppose that you always distribute your option probabilities evenly. Choosing
between A, A∗, and D , CDT says that it is permissible to not choose D . But,
given a choice between D and going on to choose between A and A∗, CDT says
that you are required to choose D . Since A, A∗, and D have the same utility
profiles (and news profiles) in each of these choices, this violates NEE, given that
options are individuated with Same Option(∗).31
(Again, we could attempt to say that your different option probabilities are
enough to make A and D in the second choice importantly different options than
they were in the first. But, again, this trivializes IIA—if you always begin deliber-
ation by giving positive probability to each available option, then IIA will never
apply. And, again, we could attempt to say that your different (unconditional)
state probabilities are enough to make the options A and D different. But, again,
this would have the uncomfortable consequence that the options between which
you are choosing change as you make up your mind about what to do—recall
the discussion in §3.2. There is also always the possibility of simply rejecting the
principles IIA and NEE; though, in my view, we should want to hold on to these
plausible principles if we can.)
Heterodox causalist theories like mine have been criticized for violating the
independence of irrelevant alternatives.32 It is therefore worth noting that, if my
conclusions here are correct, this criticism is misplaced. The apparent violations
of IIA are not unique to the heterodox; orthodox CDT also appears to violate
the principle, and in similar ways. Moreover, while orthodox CDT has additional
difficulty complying with IIA and NEE in cases like Cake in Damascus, my the-
ory of rational choice will never violate IIA orNEE, once options are individuated
with Same Option∗.
6 Conclusion
In summation, choices like Utility Cycle afford us three arguments against
CDT. I’ve presented these arguments and offered causalists three replies. The
first two objections: in Utility Cycle, CDT appears to violate weak versions
of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and normal-form extensive-form
equivalence (NEE). In response to these objections, I’ve counseled causalists to
31 The foregoing does not apply to Arntzenius’s deliberational version of causal decision theory—
that theory will always tell you to (be certain that you will) chooseD no matter which alternatives
are on the menu. It does, however, apply to other versions of deliberational causal decision
theory—Skyrms’s and Joyce’s theories, for instance.
32 See, for instance, the discussion in Wedgwood (2013), Bassett (2015), and Barnett (ms).
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individuate options in part according to their utility profiles—or, as I would pre-
fer, in terms of their news profiles. Individuating options in either of these way
prevents the principles from being trivialized and prevents CDT from violating
the principles in Utility Cycle.
The final objection: in sequential decision problems, those who abide CDT
will end up predictably poorer than those who follow EDT, even when they have
exactly the same amount of money in front of them, sitting in exactly the same
place. In response to this objection, I’ve counseled causalists to accept this conse-
quence of their view as an unfortunate intrapersonal tragedy of the commons—
avoidable by those lucky agents capable of binding their future selves.
The sequential decision problem from Wells (forthcoming) also affords causal-
ists the tu quoque that evidentialists themselves face the very same objection.
However, Utility Cycle shows that causalists should reject Wells’s why ain’cha
rich? argument against EDT. Wells contends that, if I predictably make less
money than you do in a sequential decision, when we hold fixed the state of
nature, then this shows that I am choosing irrationally. Notice, however, that in
the sequential decision Pay or A, causalists who pay $60 and go on to choose B
will be certain to make $60 less than evidentialists who don’t pay and go on to
choose B—no matter which prediction was made. So endorsing a sequential why
ain’cha rich? argument like Wells’s means abandoning CDT.
References
Ahmed, Arif. 2012. “Push the Button.” Philosophy of Science, vol. 79 (3): 386–395. [7]
—. 2014a. “Dicing with Death.” Analysis, vol. 74 (4): 587–592. [2]
—. 2014b. Evidence, Decision and Causality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK. [3], [18]
Armendt, Brad. 2019. “Causal Decision Theory and Decision Instability.” The Journal
of Philosophy, vol. 116: 263–277. [6]
Arntzenius, Frank. 2008. “No regrets, or: Edith Piaf revamps decision theory.” Erken-
ntnis, vol. 68: 277–297. [4], [22]
Arntzenius, Frank, John Hawthorne & Adam Elga. 2004. “Bayesianism, Infinite
Decisions, and Binding.” Mind, vol. 113 (450): 251–283. [18]
Bales, Adam. 2018. “Richness and Rationality: Causal Decision Theory and the WAR
Argument.” Synthese, vol. 195 (259–67). [11]
Barnett, David James. ms. “Graded Ratifiability.” [2], [7], [20], [22]
Bassett, Robert. 2015. “A Critique of Benchmark Theory.” Synthese, vol. 192 (1): 241–
267. [2], [22]
Bratman, Michael. 1999. “Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention.” In Faces
of Intention. Cambridge University Press. [18]
Briggs, R. A. 2010. “Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes.” The Philosoph-
ical Review, vol. 119 (1): 1–30. [2]
Egan, Andy. 2007. “Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory.” Philosophical
Review, vol. 116 (1): 93–114. [2]
Egan, Andy, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson. 2005. “Epistemic Modals in
Context.” In Contextualism in Philosophy, G. Preyer & G. Peter, editors, 131–170.
Oxford University Press, Oxford. [6]
Gibbard, Allan & William L. Harper. 1978. “Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of
Expected Utility.” In Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, A. Hooker, J.J.
Leach & E.F. McClennan, editors, 125–162. D. Reidel, Dordrecht. [6], [11], [19]
Hare, Caspar & Brian Hedden. 2016. “Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Deci-
sions.” Noûs, vol. 50 (3): 604–628. [6], [7], [19]
Harper, William. 1986. “Mixed Strategies and Ratifiability in Causal Decision Theory.”
Erkenntnis, vol. 24: 25–36. [6], [13]
Hunter, Daniel & Reed Richter. 1978. “Counterfactuals and Newcomb’s Paradox.”
Synthese, vol. 39 (2): 249–261. [19]
Jeffrey, Richard. 1965. The Logic of Decision. McGraw-Hill, New York. [3]
—. 2004. Subjective Probability: the Real Thing. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK. [3]
Joyce, James M. 1999. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge. [5], [11]
—. 2012. “Regret and instability in causal decision theory.” Synthese, vol. 187 (1): 123–145.
[6], [22]
Lewis, David K. 1981a. “Causal Decision Theory.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
vol. 59 (1): 5–30. [5]
—. 1981b. “‘Why ain’cha rich?’.” Noûs, vol. 15 (3): 377–380. [11]
McClennan, Edward. 1990. Rationality and Dynamic Choice. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge. [18]
Meacham, Christopher J.G. 2010. “Binding and Its Consequences.” Philosophical
Studies, vol. 149 (1): 49–71. [18]
Richter, Reed. 1984. “Rationality Revisited.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
vol. 62 (4): 392–403. [2], [6]
Sen, Amartya. 1993. “Internal Consistency of Choice.” Econometrica, vol. 61 (3): 495–521.
[13]
Skyrms, Brian. 1982. “Causal Decision Theory.” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 79 (11): 695–
711. [5]
—. 1990. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
ma. [22]
Spencer, Jack. msa. “CDT and the Guaranteed Principle.” [2], [18]
—. msb. “ Rational Monism and Rational Pluralism.” [2], [7]
Spencer, Jack & Ian Wells. 2017. “Why Take Both Boxes?” Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research. [2]
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013. “Gandalf ’s solution to the Newcomb Problem.” Synthese, vol.
190 (14): 2643–2675. [2], [7], [13], [22]
Weirich, Paul. 1985. “Decision Instability.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 63 (4):
465–478. [6]
Wells, Ian. forthcoming. “Equal Opportunity and Newcomb’s Problem.” Mind. [5],
[11], [18], [23]
Williamson, Timothy Luke. forthcoming. “Causal Decision Theory is Safe From Psy-
chopaths.” Erkenntnis. [6]
